GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN
TRANSIT A UTHORITY: AN ALTERNATE
OPINION
Joseph M. Lynch*

Warm partisans of the cause of Federal power have had reason to rejoice: National League of Cities v. Usery 1 has been over-

ruled. 2 In their view, that dreadful Rehnquist-wrong excrescence
on the written Constitution, that impudent imputation of
pseudo-tenth amendment jurisprudence has been properly set
aside.' The cause of state sovereignty, whatever that may mean,
has been left to the political process-to the people and the representatives they choose to send to Congress. Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority4 has so determined. Whether

Congress in its power to regulate commerce among the states
can so affect state activity as "to hamper the state government's
ability to fulfill its role in the Union and endanger its 'separate
and independent existence' "' is a matter to be left to the political process, not a question to be decided by thejudiciary. 6 Foreclosed by the courts, the states, in accordance with the advice in
Garcia, petitioned Congress for and received appropriate legislative relief.7 The Fair Labor Standards Act has been amended in
their favor.8
In the meantime, with relief in the courts foreclosed, those
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. A.B., St. Peters College 1948; LL.B., Harvard Law School 1951. I would like to thank my research
assistant, David Skomba, for his unwearying help in preparing this article for publication and Marie-Laurence Mancini for her very helpful editorial suggestions in
emendation of the text.
1 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1007,
1021 (1985).
3 For a compilation of critical commentary, see Nagel, Federalism As a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81, 82 nn.4-8.
4 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
5 United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 687 (1982)
(quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851).
6 See Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1016-20. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Garcia essentially adopted the position advocated by Justice Brennan in his dissent in National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (99 Stat.) 787.
8 For a discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments, see infra notes
178-185 and accompanying text.
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in favor of a committed Federal presence in a broad array of subjects are elated. 9 The elation, however, may be temporary.
While NationalLeague of Cities is overruled, it may not be dead and
buried. As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent in Garcia,
there may be a third round.'" States and local governmental
units, dissatisfied with the terms of the recent amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, or disaffected by some other provision
of that or another statute, may some day raise a new challenge.
The principle of National League of Cities may then, as Justice
Rehnquist prophesied, "again command the support of a majority of this Court."'" Justice O'Connor, in a separate dissent,
shared his expectation. 12 Although not articulated, the reason
for Justice Rehnquist's assurance lies in the advanced age of the
Court's membership and the present state of the political process. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion in Garcia,
is seventy-seven. 13 Justices Brennan and Marshall, who supported it, are seventy-nine and seventy-seven, respectively. 4 On
the other side, Justice Powell, who wrote the longest and most
vigorous dissenting opinion, is seventy-eight, as is Chief Justice
Burger, who supported him.' 5 Significant change in the personnel of the Court before the end of the decade is therefore most
likely.
Any vacancies that may occur during President Reagan's tenure are likely to be filled with appointees disposed toward the
revival of National League of Cities, for the cause of states' rights is
popular in those regions of the country from which the President
received his main support-the South and the West. 6 Moreover,
since those regions have been gaining in population at the ex9 See Nagel, supra note 3, at 81-83.
1o See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
lIld.
12 Id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
13 Justice Blackmun's date of birth is November 12, 1908. BICENTENNIAL

COM-

MI-rEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUDGES OF THE UNITED
STATES 29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as JUDGES].

14 Justice Brennan was born on April 25, 1906. Id. at 41. Justice Marshall was
born on July 2, 1908. Id. at 254.
15 Justice Powell was born on September 19, 1907. Id. at 321. Chief Justice
Burger was born on September 17, 1907. Id. at 53.
16 Portraitof the Electorate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1984, at A19, col. 4. A New York
Times/CBS News Poll survey, published the Thursday after the 1984 Presidential
election, is indicative of the President's strong support in these regions. See id.
This poll compared the 1980 and 1984 election results. Id. In 1980, President
Reagan received 52% of the vote in the South and 53% in the West. Id. By comparison, he received only 47% of the vote in the East. Id. In the 1984 election,
which was an electoral landslide for the President, while Mr. Reagan received 52%
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pense of the Midwest and the Northeast,' 7 the next president will
more likely than not be one who shares and advances their cause.
If, therefore, present political trends continue, Justice Rehnquist,
who is only sixty-one, and Justice O'Connor, who is a young fiftyfive, both from Arizona, 8 are likely to be joined by congenial
reinforcements from other states reflecting the now prevailing
values of the South and the West. Garcia will be challenged. The
revival of National League of Cities will be advocated, and another
round of litigation will commence.
It is against that day that this article is written. If National
League of Cities is to be revived, it is the argument here advanced
that its rationale should be revised so that its "traditional governmental function" test be abandoned in favor of a broader balancing of the competing local and Federal interests involved both in
that case and in future cases.' 9 It is further argued that the application of this balancing test to Garcia demonstrates that its result
was proper: The Federal interests outweighed those of the local
system, and the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
the operation of the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
was correctly sustained. z Therefore, if National League of Cities is
revived, Garcia should not be overruled. Rather, its holding
should be explained, distinguished, and followed.
A.

BACKGROUND TO GARCIA

The present flourishing state of the national economy is in
large part due to the operation of the Constitution's commerce
clause, liberally construed by the Court to effect a national economy. On the one hand, state discriminations against interstate
commerce, or in favor of local commerce, have been systematically invalidated in a succession ofjudicial decisions holding that
states cannot, by regulation or taxation, promote local industry at
the expense of out-of-state industry."' On the other hand, the
of the vote in the East, he tallied an impressive 63% and 59% in the South and
West, respectively. Id.
17 See Census Confirms a Massive Shift to South, IVest, Wash. Post,Jan. 1, 1981, at A1,
col. 1.
18 Justice Rehnquist was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on October 1, 1924, but
he is now from Phoenix, Arizona. JUDGES, supra note 13, at 332. Justice O'Connor
also hales from Phoenix, though she was born in El Paso, Texas. Her date of birth
is March 26, 1930. 2 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 2452 (43d ed. 1984).
19 See infra notes 149-171 and accompanying text (applying balancing test to
Garcia).
20 See id..
21 For examples on the issue of impermisible state regulation of commerce, see
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Court has upheld Federal regulation of such incidents of commerce that would, no matter how trivial in themselves, collectively burden interstate commerce if left unregulated. The
commercial farmer's personal consumption of his own grain-and the local restaurant owner's operation 2 3 have been considered integral parts of interstate commerce and therefore subject
to Federal regulation. Through such regulation, the Federal
Government has policed the pricing of commodities in the national market and has required local businesses to assume certain
burdens.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),2 4 the Federal statute
involved in both National League of Cities and Garcia, requires cov25
ered employers to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage
as well as no less than one and one-half times their regular rate of
pay for hours worked in excess of forty during a work week. 2 6
The constitutionality of that statute, as applied to employees engaged in manufacture, was upheld in the landmark case of United
States v. Darby,2 7 the Court holding that Congress could prohibit
the shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by
employees whose wages were less than the minimum prescribed
by the statute, or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage were
greater than the prescribed maximum. 28 It also held that Congress could in effect prohibit the employment of workers in the
production of goods for interstate commerce at other than the
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (Iowa statute retricting maximum length of vehicles allowed on highways invalid); Lewis v. BT Inv.
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (Florida statute prohibiting out-of-state bank
holding companies from owning or controlling businesses within state invalid);
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (Wisconsin regulation
prohibiting trucks longer than 55 feet from operating within state invalid); Polar Ice
Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964) (Florida statutes and regulations reserving market for local producers of milk invalid); Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U.S. 100 (1890) (state without power to interfere with sale implicitly sanctioned by
Congress until goods mingled with property of receiving state).
For examples on the issue of impermissible state taxation of commerce, see
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S.Ct. 3049 (1984) (Hawaii excise tax invalid as
discriminating against interstate commerce); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725
(1981) (Louisiana first-use tax invalid as interference with interstate commerce);
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (New York transfer
tax invalid as interference with interstate commerce).
22 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
23 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
25 Id. § 206(a).
26 Id. § 207(a)(1).
27 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
28 See id. at 113.
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prescribed wages and hours.2 9 In so holding, the Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart,3 ° which had invalidated a Federal statute prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
manufactured by child labor on the ground that since the goods
themselves were not harmful or dangerous, the statute was not a
regulation of commerce, but rather a condition of production.'
The latter had been deemed to be beyond the power of the Federal Government and
therefore reserved to the states under the
32
tenth amendment.
It is difficult for us today to comprehend the mind-set of seventy years ago, when the concept of interstate commerce was
confined to the act of transportation of goods across state lines
and held not to include the production of those goods before
shipment or their distribution thereafter. While for commercial
purposes the entire process-production, shipment, and distribution-was integral, for purposes of governmental control and
regulation, commerce was chopped up into separate and isolated
components according to the Court's then prevailing construction of the Constitution. 3 No one governmental entity was thus
capable of regulating the successive commercial components. As
a consequence, government foundered and, ironically, commerce foundered as well. The decision in Darby marked the beginning of the end of that compartmentalization.
As originally written, the FLSA excluded states and their
political subdivisions from its definition of "employer" for the
purposes of the minimum wage and overtime coverage. 4 In
1966, however, Congress amended the Act to cover virtually all
employees of hospitals, institutions, and schools operated by the
states and their subdivisions, whether or not operated for profit,
so long as they were deemed to be "enterprise[s] engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. '35 In
addition, the 1966 amendments extended coverage to employees
of all transit companies "engaged in commerce," whether pubSee id. at 125-26.
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
31 See id. at 271-72.
32 See id. at 273-75.
33 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
34 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)). The 1938 statute stated: " 'Employer'
includes any person . ..but shall not include the United States or any State or
political subdivision of a State." Id.
35 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(c), 80
Stat. 830, 831 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1982)).
29
30

1986]

GARCIA: AN ALTERNATE OPINION

licly or privately owned and whether or not subject to state or
local regulation, although they did not provide for overtime pay
protection to drivers, operaters, and conductors of such companies. 6 In 1974, Congress again broadened the FLSA coverage by
phasing out the special exclusion from overtime coverage for
transit employees3 7 and, more importantly, generally including
almost all public agencies and their employees.3
The constitutionality of these various inclusions was challenged. In Maryland v. Wirtz," the Court sustained the coverage
of employees engaged in state and municipal hospital and educational institutions.4" The Court reasoned that such employees
were engaged in enterprises affecting interstate commerce and
that Congress could regulate them so as to prevent strikes,
thereby forestalling a potentially destructive effect on interstate
commerce. 4 But when, in 1976, the Court in National League of
Cities upheld a challenge to the provision of the FLSA extending
coverage generally to all state and municipal employees, it also
overruled Wirtz. 4 2 The Court reasoned that "the challenged
amendments operate[d] to directly displace the States' freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 43 Inasmuch as the challenged amendments
did so, the Court concluded that the "constitutional doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity '" 44 implicit in the tenth amendment
barred their application.45
B.

GARCIA:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Garcia involved the FLSA coverage of employees of the San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA).4 6 SAMTA is
a regional transit authority created by the City of San Antonio
pursuant to the law of Texas47 to serve the San Antonio metro36 See id. § 206(c), 80 Stat. at 836 (repealed 1974).
37 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b),
88 Stat. 55, 68.
38 See id. § 6(a)(1), (6), 88 Stat. at 58, 60 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d),

(x) (1982)).
39 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
40 Id. at 201.

41 See id. at 188-93.
42 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855.
43 Id. at 852.
44 Id. at 837.
45 See id. at 851-52.
46 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1008.
47 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 11 18x (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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politan area. It began operations in March of 1978, taking over
the facilities and equipment of the City of San Antonio's transit
system." 8 Thereafter, in 1979, a specific inquiry was made by the
Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor regarding the applicability of the FLSA to its operations. 9 Upon
being advised that the Federal Government did not consider it
immune from coverage, SAMTA filed a complaint in a Federal
district court in Texas against the Secretary of Labor seeking a
judgment declaring that because of its asserted constitutional immunity, it was not covered by the FLSA.5 ° Joe Garcia, one of
SAMTA's employees interested in overtime coverage, was
granted leave to intervene as a defendant. 5 The American Pub52
lic Transit Association was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff.
The critical inquiry in the case was whether the operation of
a local mass transit system was an "integral [operation] in [an
area] of [a] traditional governmental [function], 53 under the test
set forth in National League of Cities,5" as later reaffirmed and redefined in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association.55
In Hodel, the Supreme Court summarized the prerequisites for
governmental immunity under National League of Cities as requiring the satisfaction of three conditions before a state activity
could be considered immune. 56 First, the regulation must affect
"the 'States as States.' -57 Second, the statute "must address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty. '"58
Third, the states' compliance must "directly impair their ability
'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' -5 The district court in Garcia held that the
operation of a local mass transit system was an "integral operation in an area of a traditional governmental function" and thus
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.6" The defendants
48 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007.

49 See Brief of Appellant Joe G. Garcia at 4, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
50 See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1009.
51 Id.

52 See Brief for the American Public Transit Association at 6, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).

53 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
54 Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007.

55 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
56
57
58
59

Id. at 287.
Id. (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
Id. at 287-88 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
Id. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
60 San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 446
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appealed to the United States Supreme Court.6 While the appeal was pending, the Court decided the case of United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road,6 2 in which it held that the tenth
amendment did not preclude the application of the Federal Railway Labor Act to the operations of a state-owned, commuter-passenger and freight-carrying railroad engaged in interstate
commerce, albeit almost wholly within the State of New York.6 3
In a unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, relied on its prior holding in United States v. California64
sustaining Federal regulation of a state-owned freight railroad,
and on its specific reaffirmation of that holding in National League
of Cities.6 5 The fact that the Long Island Rail Road was primarily
a passenger railroad made no difference.6 6 In the Court's view,
the "[o]peration of passenger railroads, no less than [the] operation of freight railroads, has traditionally been a function of private industry, not state or local governments." 6 7 The opinion
noted that at the time of the suit, only two of seventeen commuter railroads in the country were state-owned and operated,6 8
and concluded that "the historical reality" was "that the operation of [such] railroads is not among the functions traditionally
performed by state and local governments. 6 9
Although the Long Island Rail Road opinion purported to apply the "traditional governmental function" test of National
League of Cities, it laid the groundwork for a fundamental shift.
Explaining the key phrase of NationalLeague of Cities, ChiefJustice
Burger observed that the Court was not "looking only to the past
to determine what is 'traditional.' "70 He explained that the emphasis on tradition in that case
was not meant to impose a static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal regulations. Rather it
was meant to require an inquiry into whether the federal regulation affects basic state prerogatives in such a way as would be
(W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
61 Id.

455 U.S. 678 (1982).
Id. at 685.
(A 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
65 Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 685.
62
63

66
67

Id. at 686.
Id. (footnote omitted).

"8 Id. at 686 n. 12.
6, Id. at 686.
70

Id.
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likely to hamper the state government's ability to fulfill its role
in the Union
and endanger its 'separate and independent
7
existence.' 1
The Chief Justice's observation is unclear, however. Despite
the recent corruption of the word, "traditional" has meant something coming down to the present from a more distant past. In that
traditional sense of the meaning of "traditional," "the historical reality" under consideration necessarily had to be "static." If the
more recent history of the last ten years, or even the last five
months, is to be considered, then it would seem that starting with
Long Island Rail Road, the Court was not so much interested in history as such, but in an examination of the particular functions that a
state had undertaken in the light of its "ability to fulfill its role in the
Union."

72

In undertaking this examination in Long Island Rail Road, the
Court apparently focused on the fact that only two out of seventeen
commuter railroads in the country were then run under state auspices. It was this present fact, not the traditional or long past fact
that most railroads were privately run, that led the Court to decide
against a state immunity.7 3 In any event, the weight of tradition
went the other way. The Chief Justice pointed out: "Railroads
ha[d] been subject to comprehensive federal regulation for nearly a
century," 74 the Railway Labor Act 75 having been in effect for fifty-six
years.7 6
The Court also introduced another and different type of factor
that looked to the purpose of the Federal legislation, rather than to
the functions, traditional or not, it had regulated. The Court noted
that Congress had enacted the statute as the most effective means of
preventing a disruption of vital rail service, which could be ruinous
to the national economy. 77 Rather than absolutely prohibiting a
railroad strike, the Court stated that Congress had decided upon a
complex scheme of mediation and cooling-off periods, thereby "creating an almost interminable collective bargaining process." 7 The
Court therefore held that allowing states to acquire an individual
71 Id. at 686-87 (quoting NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851).
72

Id. at 687.

73

Id. at 686 & n.12.

74
75

Id. at 687 (footnote omitted).
Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45

U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1982)).
76

Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 688.

77

Id. at 688 n.20.

Id. at 689 (quoting Detroit & T.S.L. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S.
142, 149 (1969)).
78
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railroad that was an integral part of the national railroad system and
to circumvent the Federal system of collective railroad bargaining
would destroy the uniformity mandated by Congress and would endanger the efficient operations of the system.7 9 The Court further
noted that the State of New York had taken over the railroad subject
to this regulatory scheme and had operated under it for thirteen
years .80

Without saying so, the Court in Long Island Rail Road effectively
expanded the three-pronged test of National League of Cities as summarized in Hodel 8 by adding a balancing test whereunder the Court
weighed the competing state and Federal interests. In Long Island
Rail Road, it found the Federal regulatory interest to be the more
important.8 2 This approach was not unprecedented, however. In
effect, the Court had done the same in National League of Cities by
following its prior holding in Fry v. United States,"3 where it had sustained the temporary freezing of "the wages of state and local governmental employees. 8 4 The Court in National League of Cities
characterized the statute in Fry as an emergency measure "occasioned by an extremely serious problem" of inflation endangering
the national economy, which only the national government could
regulate.8 5 Since the statute temporarily froze, but did not increase,
state and local salaries, the Court concluded that the intrusion on
the states was not severe.8 6 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in National League of Cities, perhaps with the Court's
approval of Fry in mind, described the majority's opinion as
"adopt[ing] a balancing approach ... [which] does not outlaw federal power in areas .

.

. where the federal interest is demonstrably

greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal
standards would be essential." 8 7 Balancing, with its consideration
79 Id.
80 Id. at 689-90.
81 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
82 See Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 688-90.
83

84
85
86

421 U.S. 542 (1975).
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53.

Id. at 853.
See id.

Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Later, in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226 (1983), both Justice Brennan for the majority and Chief Justice Burger for the
87

minority applied what was in effect a balancing test to the question of whether the
application of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 directly
impaired the states' ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions. Compare id. at 228-44 Justice Brennan's majority opinion)
with id. at 251-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The majority held that it did not. Id. at

243-44.
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of the competing Federal interests, was therefore an indispensable,
though unarticulated, ingredient in the Court's original vindication
of a state claim of constitutional immunity.8 8 Since, however, the
Long Island Rail Road opinion did not explicitly mention balancing,
but rather continued to refer to the simple three-pronged test of
National League of Cities, lower courts likewise continued to employ
the latter test with a particular focus on the factor of "traditional
governmental function." 8 9
A few months after its decision in Long Island Rail Road, the
Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment in Garcia and
remanded it for further consideration in light of Long Island Rail
Road.9° On remand, the district court again entered judgment for
SAMTA, finding that nothing in Long Island Rail Road changed its
previous conclusion that the operation of a public mass transit system is a traditional governmental function protected by the tenth
amendment. 9 Seizing on the words of Chief Justice Burger in Long
Island Rail Road, that the requirements of a traditional governmental
function were "not meant to impose a static historical view of state
functions," 9 2 the district court relied on a four-pronged test9 3 developed by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland.9 4 In that
case, the court determined that the municipal ownership and operation of an airport constituted a traditional governmental function
for the following reasons:
(1) [T]he government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is available to the public at little or no
direct expense; (2) the service or activity is undertaken for the
purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary gain;
(3) government is the principal provider of the service or activity; and (4) government is particularly suited to provide the
service or perform the activity because of a communitywide
88 In Hodel, the court, in a footnote qualifying its summary of National League of
Cities' requirements, recognized the importance of balancing. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at
288 n.29.
89 See, e.g., Alewine v. City Counsel, 699 F.2d 1060 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1391 (1985); Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d
841 (1st Cir. 1982); Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
90 Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 457 U.S. 1102 (1982).
91 San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 44647 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
92 Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 686.
93 San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 453
(W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
94 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
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need for the service or activity.9 5
These criteria represent a substantial revision of the historically
focused test implicit in the word "tradition" 9 6 in favor of a purely
functional local governmental test. In some show of deference to
National League of Cities, the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach and the lower
court in Garcia continued to use the word "traditional," but its
meaning had been essentially changed. Applying the Amersbach test,
it was not difficult for the district court in Garcia to conclude that
public mass transit constituted a traditional governmental function.9 7 The court reasoned as follows: First, by eliminating air pollution, alleviating traffic congestion, conserving energy, and
stimulating economic development, public mass transit benefited
the community as a whole.9" Second, the economics of urban mass
transit were such that they could not be provided at a profit, and the
function, when undertaken by state or local authorities, was provided as a public service rather than for pecuniary gain.9 9 Third,
since private industry would not undertake the operation, government was peculiarly well-suited to provide it.10 0 Fourth, since by
1978, the date the case began, public transit accounted for approximately ninety per cent of mass transit operation in the country, government was the primary provider of those services.' 0 1
The trial court in Garcia also argued from analogy. National
League of Cities had stated that the provision of police, fire, public
health, sanitation, educational, and hospital services, as well as park
and recreational facilities, were among the numerous traditional operations of state and local governments. 0 2 The provision for public
mass transit, the court reasoned, was just as essential and must
therefore also be considered traditional.' 0 3 The court noted that
the states have regarded it as essential.'0 4 Indeed, Congress, in the
debates leading to the adoption of the Urban Mass Transportation
95 Id. at 1037.
96

See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.

97 San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 453-

54 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.

101 Id. at 453-54.

National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851, 855.
See San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445,
451 (W.D. Tex. 1983), revd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
104 Id.
102
103
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Act of 1964 (UMTA),' 1 5 had also recognized it as essential.' ° 6 The
court further reasoned that the origins of mass transit in the private
0 7
sector were just as irrevelant as the private origins of hospitals.
Although state-owned commuter railroads were not functionally different from publicly owned local mass transit systems, they were to
be treated differently because of the long-standing Federal regulation of their operations.'0 8 That, in the court's view, was the true
reading of Long Island Rail Road.'0 9 The trial court concluded with
an irreverent sally, one probably fatal to its position-"If transit is
to be distinguished from the exempt [NationalLeague of Cities] functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state function in
the same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows
it when they see it, but they can't describe it."" 0 It was a sally the
Supreme Court did not overlook, Justice Blackmun quoting it verbatim in his majority opinion. " The trial court's sense of humor plus
its audacious use of the revisionist Amersbach test probably did not sit
well with the majority.
The trial court's decision was complicated by an additional factor. Prior to its decision, the Third Circuit, in Kramer v. New Castle
Area Transit Authority," 2 had decided that the Court's decision in
Long Island Rail Road required the opposite holding-"that the state
involvement in local transit systems, increasing with more systems
coming under state control in recent years, does not alter the 'historical reality' that the operation of mass transit systems 'is not
among the functions traditionally performed by state and local gov105

Pub. L. No. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-

1618 (1982)).
106 San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 451
(W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
107

Id. at 453.

108 See id. at 448-49.
109 See id. at 450.
110 Id. at 453. The irreverence of the sally, of course, lay in the play on Justice

Stewart's famous and oft-derided test of pornography:
I have reached the conclusion ... that under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to
hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the
kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand

description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.
But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is
not that.

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
I II Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1010.
112

677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
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ernments.' "113 Accordingly, Kramer held that the operation of a local bus system was subject to the overtime pay requirements of the
FLSA, the issue before the Court in Garcia."145 Moreover, the
Supreme Court had denied certiorari in Kramer. 5
The opinion by Judge Gibbons in Kramer relied in part on the
fact that the immunization of state operations would erode Federal
authority in the area of mass transit.'16 Its principal reliance, however, was placed on both the governmental and economic reality
that the assumption of widespread local governmental ownership
and operation of public mass transit systems had occurred only after
the adoption of the UMTA, and the subsequent heavy Federal financing of state and local ownership and operation." 7 As Judge
Gibbons noted, the Federal Government had been and continued to
be actively involved in local mass transportation. He stated that
"[i]t provides [the following]: (1) capital grants, funded on a '80%
federal/20% local' matching basis; (2) operating grants, on a '50%
federal/50% local' matching basis; and (3) technical assistance to
state and local planning agencies on an '80% federal/20% local'
matching basis."' 18 Judge Gibbons concluded that the tradition
that had evolved, if it could be called a tradition, was one of Federalstate cooperation, whereby the Federal Government had taken the
lead and, as the contributor of the larger share of funding, had acted
as the senior partner.' 19
The trial court in Garcia attempted to meet this argument with
the reply that since expenditures under the UMTA constituted an
exercise of Congress's spending power and not of its commerce
power, the reasoning in Kramer proved too much.' 12 In 1979, it
noted, Congress had spent billions of dollars in support of the state
and local governments' provisions for health and education and mill 13 Id. at 310 (quoting Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 686).
114

Id.

115 New Castle Area Transit Auth. v. Kramer, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).

Strictly

speaking, denial of certiorari does not necessarily constitute an approval of the
lower court's decision or opinion. The denial of certiorari in Kramer, however,
should have alerted the lower court in Garcia to the Supreme Court's preliminary
disposition toward the case because Kramer involved similar facts and legal issues
and followed in time the Supreme Court's remand for further consideration in light
of Long Island Rail Road.
116 See Kramer, 677 F.2d at 310.
117

Id. at 309-10.

118 Id. at 310.
119 Id.
120 See San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445,
451-52 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
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lions in support of law enforcement. 12 1 Yet these had been immunized from the purview of the commerce clause under National
League of Cities.' 2 2
Following the entry of judgment, the Secretary of Labor and
Garcia again appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted
probable jurisdiction. 12 3 In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit, in Dove
v. ChattanoogaArea Regional TransportationAuthority,'12 also held that a
publicly owned regional mass transit system was not immunized
from compliance with the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 12 5 In
the light of Long Island Rail Road, the court declined to apply the
purely functional test it had itself proffered in Amersbach. 1 26 Taking
note of the reasons advanced in Kramer, it stated: "It would indeed
be peculiar to hold that federal aid for transit created a situation
where a state which provides transit service is immune from federal
27
labor regulations." 1
C.

PROPOSED DISPOSITION OF GARCIA

The proper disposition of Garcia lies in the reconciliation of
the two basic constitutional principles at issue in National League
of Cities and Long Island Rail Road. Rephrased in the light of the
foregoing discussions, they are, first, the preservation of the
states' autonomy so that they and their local governmental units
may retain their ability to perform necessary and appropriate
governmental functions for their people, and second, the preservation of the power of the Federal Government to regulate
problems incident to a complicated and integrated national
128
economy.
The preservation of both these principles in cases involving
Federal regulation of state and local governmental activity requires a balancing of the relative importance of the competing
state and Federal interests. In the reconciliation of these principles, a liberal measure of realism is in order. Federal regulation
of state activity under the commerce clause has been justified by
application of the well-established principle that commercial ac121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 452.
Id.; see National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851, 855.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 464 U.S. 812 (1983).
701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 52.
See id. For a discussion of the Amersbach test, see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
127 Dove, 701 F.2d at 53.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 55-127.
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tivity, though trivial in itself, may, when "taken together with that
of many others similarly situated," cumulatively affect interstate
commerce. 2 9 The Federal Government is responsible for the
appropriate regulation of the national economy, and through
such regulation, the entire country benefits. Federal interest in
the regulation of activity that is not in itself commercial, but
merely affects commerce, however, is not as strong as its interest
in the regulation of purely commercial activity. This consideration does not bear on the validity of the power as such. It does
bear, however, on the vindication of a tangential exercise of the
commerce power in the presence of a countervailing constitutional interest. Thus, a private person or corporation cannot
complain of a Federal regulation affecting the commercial aspects of a purely noncommercial activity, such as the application
of the National Labor Relations Act' 30 to a nonprofit private
charity. 13 When such an application would affect the guarantees
of the religious clauses of the first amendment, however, the
Supreme Court has held that the statute should be construed to
deny the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board over
church-related high schools in order to avoid a constitutional
conflict.' 3 2 A second such countervailing constitutional interest
129 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). In that case, Filburn, a dairy
and poultry farmer, maintained the side practice of raising a small acreage of wheat,
customarily setting aside a part of his harvest for personal consumption, another
part as feed for his poultry and livestock, and finally, a part for sale on the market.
Id. at 114. The Court held that consumption of wheat grown on the premises constituted the most variable factor in the total amount of the nation's wheat crop,
thereby coming within the ambit of the Government's power to regulate the price
of wheat. Id. at 127-28. The Court concluded "[t]hat appellee's own contribution
to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from
the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id.; see also NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
130 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982).
131 In 1974, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act to bring nonprofit hospitals within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. See
Act ofJuly 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 1(a), 88 Stat. 395, 395 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1982)); see also Bay Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d
1174 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
132 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Catholic Bishop, the
Court stated:
[A]lthough the respondents press their claims under the Religion
Clauses, the question we consider first is whether Congress intended the
Board to have jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools. In
a number of cases the Court has heeded the essence of Mr. ChiefJustice
Marshall's admonition in Aiuray v. The Charming Betsy,, 2 Cranch 64, 118
(1804), by holding that an Act of Congress ought not be construed to
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is that of the states in the preservation of their autonomy
whereby they may serve the people in their respective states. In
cases of Federal regulation, the benefit supposedly accruing from
the regulation should be more closely examined, and the consequent harm to those served by the state or local governmental
unit should be fairly appraised.
The Federal regulation in National League of Cities involved
the requirement under the FLSA of minimum wages, maximum
hours, and overtime pay for almost all state and local employees. " ' It thus affected a commercial aspect of almost all the noncommercial activities of state and local units. Police and fire
personnel, town clerks, state registry workers, road repairmen,
and school teachers are all involved in noncommercial activity.
An appraisal of the supposed benefits accruing to the national
interest and the resultant harm to the state's interest should be
made. While the Federal regulation in National League of Cities affected the wage structures of state and local governmental units
specifically and wage structures generally, its benefit to the national economy was problematic. The ensuing increase in
purchasing power due to the raise in pay would be offset by
either the reduction in governmental expenditures, or the additional and local taxes necessary to pay the raise. On the other
hand, the harm to those served by the states and local governmental units was, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, obviouseither the ensuing reduction in services or the additional
taxes. 3 4 The beneficiaries of the amendment to the FLSA were
not the residents of the various states or of the United States, but
rather the unions of state and local governmental employees. In
reality, Congress seemed to be representing this special constituency rather than the people of the states or the United States.
Long Island Rail Road stood on different grounds, however.
The Federal regulation in that case covered only one class of employees, those working on passenger and freight-carrying railviolate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available. Moreover, the Court has followed this policy in the interpretation
of the Act now before us and related statutes.
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500.
The Court, in the same case, also referred to the problem inherent in an assertion of NLRB jurisdiction over employees of religious hospitals, pointing out the
special provisions made in the National Labor Relations Act for such institutions.
Id. at 506.
133 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 835-36; see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing the FLSA).
134 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 848.
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roads,' 35 almost all of whom were employed in private industry
both at the time of the original enactment and at the commencement of the case.' 3 6 The statute was therefore one directly regulating a commercial activity. Its aim, moreover, was not to
benefit labor or, for that matter, industry, but rather the general
public by ensuring stable labor relations in an industry crucial to
the operation of the national economy.' 3 7 As Chief Justice Burger emphasized, both the national interest and the interest of the
Federal Government in the continued operation of the statute
were therefore strong, continuing, and long-standing. 138 While
it was true that by the time the case began, the state operation of
the commuter railroad did not constitute a commercial venture,
most commuter railroads were still largely operated as such, and
the Long Island Rail Road was nonetheless part of a national railroad system requiring uniform national regulation. But more importantly, the state interest in the substitution of its own strike
legislation was not crucial; the freedom of their railroad employees to strike, though prohibited by 9state law, was nevertheless
13
severely limited under Federal law.
Balancing the respective state and Federal interests, where
did Garcia stand? The dissenters, in voting to affirm the judgment of the trial court, barely considered the issue. Justices Powell' 4 ' and O'Connor 4 ' devoted pages to attacks on the evils of
overruling National League of Cities. Justice Rehnquist142 con-

curred with those attacks in a one paragraph opinion, and Chief
Justice Burger 14 3 concurred without opinion. Justice Powell
alone considered the merits and then only briefly in one paragraph. 4 4 The municipal operation of a mass transit system was,
135 See Railway Labor Act § 1, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).

136 See Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. at 686 n.12 (stating that only two out of seventeen commuter railroads were publicly owned at time of suit).
1"7 See id. at 688-89.
138 See id.
139 See generally id. at 689.
140 See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1021-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141 See id. at 1033-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14'3 See id. at 1021.
144 See id. at 1032 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in her dissent,
opined that the proper resolution of the case lay "in weighing state autonomy as a
factor in the balance when interpreting the means by which Congress can exercise
its authority on the States as States." Id. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She
did not, however, attempt to apply a balancing test in the Garcia case in view of the
majority's decision to overrule National League of Cities. See id. at 1038 (O'Connor,J.,
dissenting).
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he wrote, a classic example of a local governmental unit "indistinguishable in principle from the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, public lighting, traffic control, water,
and sewerage systems." ' 145 Itwas the kind of service the quality
and cost of which only local officials could adequately judge and
provide. Therefore, he concluded, this type of local activity
should also be immunized from Federal regulation under the
principle of National League of Cities. 14 6 Although Justice Powell
chastised Justice Blackmun for abandoning the balancing test he
had advocated in his concurring opinion in NationalLeague of Cities,' 4 7 Justice Powell himself, because he was preoccupied with
the overruling of NationalLeague of Cities, did not properly employ
a balancing test. He also failed to follow the essential reasoning
of that case-that the application of the FLSA standards to almost all state and local governmental employees would burden
those governments and lead to a reduction in services, or a rise in

taxes. 148
Let us now apply a balancing test. On behalf of the states, it
can be said that public mass transit, by and large operating at a
deficit, is no longer a business and, in any realistic sense of the
word, no longer commerce. 4 9 Private industry has mostly abandoned the operation of public mass transit precisely because it
cannot make money, and state and local governments have engaged in ownership and operation not to make money, but as a
public service.1 50 Today, the provision for mass transit is-like
145 Id. at 1032 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
146 Id.

147 Id.; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's balancing test in National League of Cities).
148 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
149 "[P]ublic transit is provided at a heavily subsidized price. Fares are nominal
and account for only 25 percent of operating expenses. While some of the fare
subsidy is from federal funding, a larger portion is from tax revenues collected
pursuant to... statute.... The reality of transit industry economics is that services
cannot be provided at a profit." San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 453 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. (1985) (citations omitted). But see Tolchin,
Private Concerns Gaining Foothold in Public Transit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1985, at Al,

col. 4 (stating that supporters of shift to private ownership of mass transit claim that
"private operators can manage and operate . . . with more efficiency and less
expense").
150 "[G]overnment is today the primary provider of transit services.... By 1978,
public transit accounted for 91 percent of total vehicle miles, 91 percent of linked
passenger trips, 90 percent of revenues generated, and 87 percent of transit vehicles operated." San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp.
445, 453-54 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub norm. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (citation omitted).
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the provision for an adequate road network, safe and suitable
bridges, adequate sewage systems, and even a public airportpart of the infrastructure that state and local government must
maintain to keep its community attractive to both business and
residents.' 5' Federal requirements imposed under the FLSA on
these various kinds of noncommercial governmental activity
hamper the states' and local governments' ability to serve these
public needs, and lead either to a reduction in these services or
to an increase in user fees or taxes. In either case, the public
suffers. Only the labor unions are helped. Such is the argument
based on National League of Cities.

This argument as applied to Garcia, however, overlooked
one salient fact: the abiding Federal interest, not present in National League of Cities, that under the UMTA the Federal Government provided substantial revenue toward the cost of the transit
system's operation as well as toward its capital and technical
assistance cost. 15 2 In fact, as pointed out in Kramer, it was the
Federal Government which by the terms of the UMTA initiated
the present system of widespread public mass transit. 5 ' Under
these circumstances, the Federal interest was far stronger and
more complex than in National League of Cities. The Federal Gov-

ernment was not by regulation merely raising the wages of public
mass transit employees. Since the amount of the grants was far
in excess of any required overtime costs, 5 ' the Government was
providing money out of which the raise might be paid. By the
151 "Public transit benefits the community as a whole, helping to eliminate air
pollution, alleviate traffic congestion, conserve energy, and stimulate economic development." San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp.
445, 453 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (citations omitted).
152 During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, UMTA grants provided $12.5 million
toward operating expenses. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1008. By way of comparison, fares
generated only $10.1 million of revenue, and local taxes provided $26.8 million.
Id. As the Solicitor General noted in his brief, these grants amounted to approximately 30% of SAMTA's operating expenses. Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 7,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). From
December, 1970 until February, 1980, the San Antonio Transit System and
SAMTA, its successor, received over $51 million in UMTA grants, of which
$31,040,080 represented capital grants, $20,620,270 represented operating assistance, and $28,654 was for technical assistance. Id. at 7-8. In effect, the Federal
Government was providing SAMTA with an average of $5 million a year-$3 million for capital costs and $2 million for operating expenses. Indeed, in addition to
the above amounts, SAMTA received Federal funding commitments in 1979 in order to procure 325 buses. Id. at 8 n.10.

15"3See Kramer, 677 F.2d at 309.
154 See Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1020. The Court stated: "In short, Congress has not
simply placed a financial burden on the shoulders of States and localities that oper-
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same token,' 5 5 the states came out ahead. On the whole, their
ability to provide the transit service was enhanced rather than
hampered by the Federal involvement, and they could not fairly
complain about the comparatively minimal burden of one aspect
of that involvement. Also, by accepting large grants of Federal
money for their operations, the states had essentially compromised the cause of state sovereignty. Since they were no longer
functioning as separate and independent entities, the states could
scarcely talk in terms of state and local autonomy.
Justice Blackmun, in his decision to overrule National League
of Cities, did not overlook these factors.' 5 6 In his judgment, however, the large Federal funding of local mass transit was not the
determinative factor in deciding whether Congress had unconstitutionally burdened a traditional state function.157 Rather, it was
proof that the national political process, as it operates in and
through Congress, had systematically protected the states from
5
overburdensome regulation under the commerce clause.' 1
The conclusion offered here, that the large measure of Federal funding under the UMTA offset the lesser monetary burden
imposed by the overtime requirements of the FLSA, was disputed
by the trial court in Garcia for three reasons.' 5 9 It was one thing,
the court considered, for states voluntarily to accept Federal regulation in the form of conditions upon the acceptance of a grant,
but another to suffer its imposition in the form of errant regulation. 60 This is true, but it does not meet the argument here adate mass-transit systems, but has provided substantial countervailing financial
assistance as well." Id.
155 Pun not intended, but at the same time not suppressed.
156

See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.

See id. at 1020 n.21. Justice Blackmun stated: "Our references to UMTA are
not meant to imply that regulation under the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial benefits under the Spending Clause. The applica157

tion of the FLSA to SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not
provided federal funding under UMTA." Id.
158 Id. at 1020. Justice Blackmun stated:

[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action.
The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States

will not be promulgated. In the factual settings of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended.

Id.
159J San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 45152 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
160 Id.
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vanced that the errancy of the Federal regulation is to be judged
in the realistic terms of whether the state operates as a separate
and independent entity with respect to the matter regulated. 6 '
Empty, if proud, rhetoric is not helpful to the genuine complaints
of states' rights advocates. The trial court further considered any
reference to Federal funding unfaithful to the holding in National
League of Cities.' 62 In its estimation, the Federal Government had
during fiscal year 1979 appropriated approximately $25 billion to
the states for use in various functions such as law enforcement,
administration ofjustice, health, and education, as well as for the
construction of sewage treatment plants, not to mention the
money additionally granted for mass transit. 163 The trial court
also used the recent dramatic reductions in Federal funding to
the states as an example of why the existence of Federal funding
was an inappropriate consideration. 164 Since Federal funding
was responsive to changing political demands, the trial court concluded it was not a reliable measure of the state's sovereign
interest.165
These last two reasons suffer from the same defect as the
first. The existence of the states as separate and independent
sovereignties may be an ideal. It may be in the best interest of
the people, and it may be what the framers of the Constitution
had originally intended and what the authors of The Federalistcontemplated. 166 But the reality is that the states have accepted billions of dollars from the United States for the performance of
161 See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text (arguing state was not acting
as a "separate and independent entity").
162 See San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445,
452 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
163 See id. See also the list of Federal funding authorizations for these various
purposes collected in Justice Blackmun's opinion in Garcia. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at
1019 & n.15.
164 See San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445,
452 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
165 Id.
166 James Madison, for instance, considered the existence of the several independent states as a guarantee against the Federal Government's oppression:
[A]mbitious encroachments of the Federal Government, on the authority of State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single
State or of a few states only. They would be signals of general alarm.
Every Government [i.e., State governments,] would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance
would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.
The same combination in short would result from an apprehension of
the foederal [sic], as was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke.
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their ordinary governmental functions. As a result, they are
hardly in a position to complain about the concomitant burden of
costs imposed by the United States incident to the performance
of the functions, so long as the costs imposed do not exceed the
amount received for the performance. Or, to put it in the language of sovereignty, a state that financially depends upon another government for the funding of its basic functions is
governmentally dependent. It has compromised both its independence and its sovereignty.
As long as that condition persists, the holding in National
League of Cities that the mere Federal regulation of a state in the
performance of one of its governmental functions (let us for the
moment put aside the issue of whether it is, or needs to be,
"traditional") is subject to serious reconsideration.' 6 7 It should
be pointed out, however, that the majority opinion in that case
not only left open the question whether Congress, by the use of
Federal funding under the spending power, could "affect integral
operations of state governments,"' 6 8 it also did not consider the
effect of Federal funding on the exercise of Federal power under
the commerce clause. Rather, the Court accepted the plaintiff's
allegations that the cost to the state and local governmental units
in complying with the Federal requirements for overtime had "a
significant impact on the functioning of the governmental bodies
involved."' 6 9 While the amount of this impact was challenged,
the accuracy of the plaintiff's estimate was not considered crucial
to the determination. 7 ° The Court considered the impact on
state and local governments significant in any event. 7 1 No countervailing Federal interest was argued.
In recent years, all these considerations have been placed in
a different focus. In response to proposals by the Reagan AdTHE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 320 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (A. Hamilton).
Eventually these statements were used in justification of the famous Kentucky
and Virginia resolutions of 1798 protesting against certain acts of Congress and the
Adams administration, and purporting to "interpose" the powers of state government between the allegedly usurpative powers of the Federal Government and the
people whose liberties the latter threatened. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
350-51 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (advocating federal form of government).
167 This is based on the assumption of this article that the holdings of National
League of Cities would, on a later challenge, be revived. See supra text accompanying
notes 11 & 19.

168 N\ational League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17.
169 Id. at 846.
170 Id. at 846, 851.
'71

Id.

at 846.
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ministration, Congress has substantially reduced the level of Federal aid to states and local governments. 1 72 Large measures of
unwanted sovereignty have consequently been thrust back upon
the state and local governmental units over their sometimes vociferous protests. 1 73 Responding to the President's further proposals that government at every level should return the
performance of certain activities to private business wherever
possible, the Urban Mass Transit Administration has been urging
the states to return substantial segments of their public mass
transit systems to private hands. 1 74 In this new political climate,
state and local governmental units, with the support of President
Reagan, pressed Congress to undo the overruling of National
League of Cities and to amend the FLSA by discontinuing the basic
requirements for overtime pay for state and local governmental
employees. 175 Unions of state and local governmental employees
lobbied against them. 176
A compromise was reached and
17 7
adopted into law.
Pursuant to the new law and subject to certain prescribed
conditions, a public agency, whether it be a state, a political subdivision, or an interstate agency, may grant compensatory time
off at the rate of "one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime cash compensation is [generally] required" by the provisions of the FLSA. 1 7 8 This, of course,
benefits the public agency: As a result of Garcia, SAMTA was required to compensate for overtime in cash. On the other hand,
the new arrangement to some extent benefits the employee since
172 See, e.g., Governors Told Funds Will Be Cut, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1985, at A1, col.
6; States Are Warned Reductions in Store for Federal Grants, Wash. Post, July 28, 1984, at
A4, col. 3; Aid to States, Localities Declinesfor First Time, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 1983, at
A2 1, col. 4; Reagan Runs Into Resistance on Transferring Programs to States, Wash. Post,
Mar. 2, 1981, at A 11, col. 1.
173 See, e.g., Mayors Rally Here to Save Urban Funds, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1985, at
A6, col. 1; Cilie. Feel Stranded, Mayor Reports, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1985, at A5, col. 1;
State, Local Leade's Cry Foul on Budget, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1983, at A4, col. 1; Governors Rap Reagans Cuts in Programs, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1981, at A4, col. 1; State
Legislators Gather Anxiously to Talk About Reagan's Fiscal Policies, Wash. Post, July 29,
1981, at A2, col. 1.
174 See Private Concerns Gaining Foothold in Public Transit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1985,
at Al, col. 4.
175 See Reagan IW1ill Push to Soften Court's Ruling on Overtime, Wall St. J., Sept. 11,
1985, at 10, col. 1.
176 See id.
177 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (99 Stat.) 787.
178 Id. § 2(a), 99 Stat. at 787.
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under the preexisting rule of National League of Cities, he was not
entitled to any form of overtime compensation.
The amendment further provides for the allowance of alternate time off compensation on the following conditions: (1) that
it be made pursuant to a prior agreement, collective or personal,
between the public agency and the union representative or the
individual himself,' 7 9 and (2) that it be limited to a specified
number of accumulated, uncompensated overtime hours. 180 In
the case of employees engaged in work connected with public
safety, emergency response (including hospital work), or seasonal activities, compensatory time off may not exceed 480
hours. 18 1 In all other cases, compensatory time off may not exceed 240 hours. 8 2 In addition, compliance with the overtime
and record keeping provisions of the FLSA is not required until
April 15, 1986,183 and to accommodate existing public agency
budgets, actual cash payments for overtime may be deferred until
August 1, 1986.184 Incidental provisions regarding outside employment, compensation for volunteer workers, and the like were
85

also made. 1

This compromise seems to be in the best public interest. To
some extent, and within limits, it codifies the existing and widely
used practice whereby state and local governmental units compensate for overtime work with time off rather than cash. 18 6 The
banking of compensatory time, thwarted by the Garcia decision, is
now again permissible. 8 7 Such banking allows public agencies
the flexibility they require in the allocation of their financial resources and minimizes the likelihood of arbitrary and sudden
suspensions of services, or the unpopular imposition of additional taxes. Perhaps the compromise vindicates the optimism of
Justice Blackmun regarding the political process and the ability
of the states and their local governments through that process to
179 Id.
180

Id., 99 Stat. at 788.

181 Id.

Id.
Id. § 2(c)(1). The statute provides, however, that existing collective bargaining agreements that permit compensatory time off shall generally remain effective.
Id. § 2(b).
184 Id. § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. at 789.
185 See id. §§ 3, 4, 99 Stat. at 789-90.
186 See Statement by National Association of Counties 1 (undated) (discussing the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985).
187 See id.
182

183
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persuade Congress of the reasonableness of their position. 188 In
form, at least, the resolution of this issue should appeal to the
present majority of the Court. The substance of the resolution,
however, should appeal to the dissent, for it seems to vindicate
the essence of Justice Rehnquist's position in National League of
Cities. 189

In fact, I suspect, the compromise effectuated in the recent
amendment reflects a number of factors: the numerical strength
of the dissent, the present underlying popular support for their
substantive position, and the professional assessment of lobbyists
and elected officials on Capitol Hill that anything short of this
compromise would likely meet a renewed challenge in a "third
round" of litigation in a Federal court. 9 ° Spurred by Justice
Rehnquist's prophecy, if not invitation, of that litigation, the

challenge would of course be raised at such time as, after appropriate changes in the Court's personnel, would seem likely to
produce a successful outcome.' 9 '
As for Joe Garcia, who so graciously lent his name to the
case that provoked the legislation, the amendment to the FLSA
leaves him poorer in cash, albeit richer in time off, than he would
have been ha" the Court itself decided the case on the merits and
applied th
..ancing test it utilized in both National League of Cities and Long Island Rail Road.'92 Garcia, however, is not the first
litigant to fall victim to the swirling winds of prevailing and countervailing judge-made constitutional doctrine. Nevertheless, it
seems a shame. He should have won. That the states must retain
their ability to fulfill their role in the Union in the service of the
people, who are, after all, at the same time the people of the
United States, is an important constitutional principle. Whether
in a particular case a state retains that ability is, however, a question of fact. When the state is actually dependent, and therefore
not sovereign, the question of so-called state sovereignty is irrelevant. Just as when the Federal Government obstructs the states
in the performance of their essential functions, the question of

Federal sovereignty is irrelevant. In both cases, sovereignty
should yield to the central consideration-whether the needs of
the people are met. Service of the people, not the fanciful doctrines of competing state and Federal power, is the reason for the
388

See supra notes 4-6, 157-158 and accompanying text.

189 See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
19o See supra text accompanying note 11.

I1) See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 133-138.
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existence of governments. When, therefore, after a fair assessment, the Court has determined in a given case, as in Garcia, that
the Federal Government has not obstructed but in fact aided the
state in the service of local needs, no sound constitutional impediment exists to the enforcement of Federal policy such as the payment of overtime cash. In the ordinary pursuit of fact, the Court
should eschew the positing of unnecessary constitutional doctrine, and in the reconciliation of local needs and individual
claims, do justice in the case.

